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Abstract  
 Background and Objectives: Although experiential avoidance has been shown to 
predict a wide range of mental health problems, there has been minimal research to-date on the 
more immediate effects of engaging in experiential avoidance in the moment or the moderators 
that predict when it is more or less harmful. Methods: An ecological momentary assessment 
(EMA) study was conducted with 70 undergraduate students who completed assessments three 
times a day, over seven days as well as a baseline assessment of global questionnaires. Results: 
Both greater global experiential avoidance and momentary experiential avoidance independently 
predicted greater momentary negative affect, lower positive affect, and lower valued action. 
Global experiential avoidance was also a significant moderator of momentary experiential 
avoidance such that experiential avoidance in the moment was more strongly related to negative 
effects among those high in global experiential avoidance. Limitations: Study limitations 
include a non-clinical student sample and use of unvalidated EMA items. Conclusions: Overall, 
these results suggest engaging in experiential avoidance in the moment has more negative, 
immediate effects particularly among those who engage in global, inflexible patterns of 
experiential avoidance.  
Keywords: experience sampling method; college students; acceptance and commitment 
therapy; mindfulness. 
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When is experiential avoidance harmful in the moment? Examining global experiential 
avoidance as a moderator 
There is a substantial literature demonstrating the negative effects of experiential avoidance 
on mental health, in which people engage in rigid patterns of behavior seeking to escape, avoid, 
or otherwise change unwanted internal states. Experiential avoidance has been found to predict a 
wide range of problems including depression, anxiety, obsessive compulsive symptoms, 
posttraumatic stress symptoms, addiction, and eating disorders, among many other psychological 
and behavioral challenges (Aldao et al., 2010; Bluett et al., 2014; Chawla & Ostafin, 2007). For 
example, experiential avoidance has been found to predict a range of anxiety disorders up to two 
years later (Spinhoven et al., 2014) and above and beyond related variables such as general 
distress (Levin et al., 2014) and anxiety sensitivity (Gloster et al., 2011).  
However, the vast majority of research on experiential avoidance has used global self-report 
questionnaires, examining cross-sectional or longitudinal relations between a self-reported 
general tendency or trait-like pattern of experiential avoidance and overall mental health. Such 
research provides an estimate of overall relations between constructs, but leaves out nuances that 
have practical implications such as what are the immediate effects of engaging in experiential 
avoidance in the moment and what are the contexts and person-level predictors of when 
momentary instances of experiential avoidance are more or less harmful. Among other 
implications, this can inform treatment tailoring such as the relevant client characteristics and 
contexts in which acceptance oriented versus change oriented therapeutic strategies are indicated 
for difficult internal experiences.  
Recently, a series of studies have examined the immediate effects of momentary experiential 
avoidance (i.e., specific instances or time periods of engaging in experiential avoidance) on 
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mental health in the moment using ecological momentary assessment (EMA). This method 
provides intensive longitudinal data, with multiple observations often taken each day through 
prompted assessments. EMA studies demonstrate that greater momentary experiential avoidance 
predicts greater social anxiety (Kashdan et al., 2014), greater negative affect and lower positive 
affect (Hershenberg et al., 2017), lower self-esteem (Udachina et al., 2009), and greater paranoia 
(Udachina et al., 2014). These studies provide more direct evidence for the immediate, negative 
effects of engaging in experiential avoidance in the moment on mental health outcomes (e.g., 
positive and negative affect, maladaptive cognitive patterns, engagement in effective, meaningful 
activities). This provides a more fine-grained unit of analysis focused on the immediate, 
proximal effects of engaging in experientially avoidant behaviors, in contrast to previous survey 
research identifying broad, global relations between patterns of experiential avoidance and 
mental health.  
In addition to providing more detailed data regarding the immediate effects of momentary 
experiential avoidance, EMA is an ideal method for identifying moderating variables for when 
and whom experiential avoidance is more or less harmful. Although global patterns of 
experiential avoidance are often conceptualized as a pathological process relevant to modern 
cognitive behavioral therapies such as acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes 
Strosahl & Wilson., 2011), these treatment models do not assume momentary experiential 
avoidance is always harmful in all contexts for all individuals. There are almost certainly 
situations in which employing strategies to reduce or change unwanted inner experiences is more 
or less adaptive, and person-level characteristics for whom experiential avoidance is more or less 
harmful.  However, we are aware of only one study to-date that directly examined this, finding 
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that momentary experiential avoidance was more strongly related to anxiety in social interactions 
among individuals with social anxiety disorder (Kashdan et al., 2014).  
Global experiential avoidance may be another person-level moderator of the immediate 
effects of engaging in experiential avoidance in the moment. Theoretically momentary instances 
of experiential avoidance may be more harmful to mental health for individuals with a pervasive, 
global history of responding inflexibly to internal experiences as harmful and to be avoided at all 
costs (i.e., global experiential avoidance). Such individuals are more likely to engage in 
experiential avoidance rigidly despite harmful consequences or at a higher frequency that has 
cumulative negative effects (Levin, Hayes & Vilardaga, 2012). In other words, experiential 
avoidance might not be problematic when it is intermittently used as one of many ways of 
responding to internal experiences, but might become harmful when it is employed rigidly in the 
context of a chronic, global pattern of inflexibly responding to unwanted thoughts and feelings as 
harmful and necessary to avoid. However, there have been no previous studies of which we are 
aware that have examined whether global experiential avoidance moderates the in the moment 
effects of experiential avoidance on proximal mental health variables such as affect and 
engagement in valued actions (i.e., meaningful activities linked to personal values).  
The current study aimed to test whether momentary experiential avoidance is more strongly 
related to momentary mental health variables (i.e., higher negative affect, lower positive affect, 
lower valued action) among individuals higher in global experiential avoidance. An EMA 
method was used with a sample of 70 undergraduate students completing multiple daily 
measures of momentary experiential avoidance, affect, and valued action over a seven-day 
period. We predicted that greater momentary experiential avoidance would relate to greater 
momentary negative affect, lower positive affect, and lower valued action. Furthermore, we 
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predicted global experiential avoidance would moderate the relation between momentary 
experiential avoidance and affect/valued action such that participants who were more globally 
avoidant would demonstrate a stronger relation between greater momentary experiential 
avoidance and lower affect/valued action.   
Methods 
Participants  
 A sample of 70 adult undergraduate students participated in the study. Participants were 
recruited through an online research participation platform and received research credit in their 
courses for participating. The mean age of participants was 21.79 (SD=7.13) and the majority of 
the sample was female (64.8%). The sample was relatively homogeneous in race (90.1% White, 
1.4% Black, 5.6% Asian, 1.4% Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 1% Other), with only 4.2% 
of the sample identifying as Hispanic/Latino. There were no inclusion criteria related to level of 
distress. Overall, 33% of the sample reported moderate or greater symptoms of distress based on 
cutoff scores for the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), which 
are similar to rates found in other undergraduate student samples (e.g., Beiter et al., 2015). In the 
current sample, the mean DASS depression score was 7.64 (SD = 7.68), anxiety was 6.08 (SD = 
6.13), and stress was 10.55 (SD = 6.12). 
Procedures 
 Participants attended an in-person appointment to complete informed consent, baseline 
assessment, and orientation to the EMA procedure. After providing informed consent, the 
baseline assessment was completed through an online Qualtrics survey on a desktop computer in 
the laboratory. Participants were then oriented to the EMA procedures by a research assistant. 
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This included downloading the EMA survey, showing participants how to complete assessments 
on their phone, and reinforcing the importance of adherence to all prompted assessments.  
 Participants proceeded to complete EMA procedures over the following seven days. 
EMAs were prompted and completed using the MetricWire mobile platform, which provides a 
native app to deliver customized push notifications and assessments through a downloaded 
mobile app. Notifications to complete an assessment were randomly provided three times a day 
between 9am and 9pm, with a minimum of 1 hour between triggers. A reminder prompt was sent 
10 minutes after an assessment prompt if no response was provided. Notifications were 
scheduled for random times in order to minimize any time-specific or potentially confounding 
effects that may be present through random sampling of times. Each EMA included 24 items 
assessing affect, experiential avoidance, and valued action, with each item rated on a 5-point 
scale. Two days after the baseline appointment a research assistant made a check-in call to 
answer any questions about completing assessments and troubleshoot any barriers participants 
might encounter. The final step of the study was to complete an online post assessment seven 
days after the baseline appointment. Participants received course credit for participating and the 
study was approved by the authors’ institutional review board.   
Baseline Global Measures 
 Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011). The 7-item 
AAQ-II was used as a self-report measure of global experiential avoidance. Each item is rated 
from 1 (“Never true”) to 7 (“Always true”). Example items include “Emotions cause problems in 
my life” and “I’m afraid of my feelings.” The AAQ-II has been shown to have acceptable 
internal consistency and convergent and divergent validity (Bond et al., 2011). Internal 
consistency in the current study sample was excellent ( = 0.91).  
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 Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The 21-
item DASS was used as a measure of psychological distress to examine the preliminary 
convergent/divergent validity of the EMA items. The DASS includes subscales assessing 
anxiety, depression, and stress symptoms, with a total score used for validity analyses. Internal 
consistency for the DASS in the current sample was ( = 0.89).  
 Satisfaction with Social Roles (SSR; Hahn et al., 2010). The 11-item SSR was used as 
a measure of social functioning to examine the validity of the EMA items. The SSR was selected 
from the patient-reported outcomes measurement information system (PROMIS), which have 
been found to be reliable an valid in previous research (Hahn et al., 2016). The SSR had 
adequate internal consistency in the current sample ( = .92). 
 Valuing Questionnaire – Progress (VQ-Pro; Smout et al., 2014). The 5-item VQ 
progress subscale was used as a measure of valued action to examine validity of the EMA items. 
The VQ progress scale assesses progress in taking actions consistent with one’s values (e.g., “I 
made progress in the areas of my life I care most about”). The VQ progress subscale has been 
found to be reliable and valid in previous research (Smout et al., 2014). Internal consistency for 
the VQ-Pro in the current sample was ( = 0.73). 
EMA Measures 
Affect. Four items assessed positive emotions (happy, excited, joyful, confident) and six 
items assessed negative emotions (nervous, ashamed, sad, angry, guilty, irritable) based on the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Each 
emotion question was phrased as “Right now, how _____ do you feel?” All EMA items, 
including affect, were rated on the same 5-point scale, from “Not at all” to “Very much so”. The 
PANAS includes a validated version for emotions in the moment (Watson & Clarke, 1994) and 
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previous studies have used similar PANAS items in EMA research (e.g., Moore et al., 2014). In 
order to minimize assessment burden, a set of 10 items were selected to include a variety of 
emotional experiences, particularly in terms of types of negative emotions spanning primary 
emotions (e.g., sadness, fear, anger) and both high (e.g., nervous, angry) and low arousal (e.g., 
guilty, sad). In the current study, negative affect inter-item correlation coefficients ranged 
between .28 and .66 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .81. Positive affect inter-item correlations ranged 
between .60 and .81 with  = 0.91.  
Valued action. Three novel items were used to assess valued action, the degree to which 
one was successful in acting consistently with personal values. These items included “Since the 
last prompt, were you able to do what matters to you?”, “Since the last prompt, how content were 
you with the amount and types of things you did?”, and “Since the last prompt, were your actions 
in line with the kind of person you want to be?” Items were rated on the same 5-point scale from 
“Not at all” to “Very much so.” In the current study, inter-item correlations ranged between .62 
and .72 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .86. 
Experiential avoidance. Momentary experiential avoidance was assessed with seven 
items. Four item assessed engagement in specific experientially avoidant strategies “since the 
last prompt” including distraction (“…how much did you do things to distract from negative 
thoughts and feelings?”), rumination (“…how much did you think over and over your 
problems?”), thought suppression (“…how much did you try not to think about certain things?”) 
and reappraisal (“…how much did you try to change the way you thought about situations?”). 
Three items assessed broader experiential avoidance “since the last prompt” (“Since the last 
prompt, how much effort did you put into making negative feelings or thoughts go away?”, 
“Since the last prompt, how much did you struggle to control negative feelings or thoughts?”, 
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“Since the last prompt, how much did you give up saying or doing what mattered to you in order 
to manage negative feelings?”). These EMA items were based on existing measures (e.g., 
Kashdan et al., 2014), but were adapted to reference the broad range of inner experiences that 
might be avoided in this general sample (e.g., Kashdan et al., 2014 focused on anxiety) and to 
include additional items focused on specific coping behaviors that typically function as 
momentary experiential avoidance (e.g., adding items to assess distraction, rumination, thought 
suppression, and reappraisal). This helped ensure a momentary measure of experiential 
avoidance that would be relevant to the range of distressing experiences students might 
encounter and that would focus specifically on instances of experientially avoidant behaviors that 
might occur in the moment. Items were rated on the same 5-point scale, from “Not at all” to 
“Very much so.” The experiential avoidance items demonstrated strong internal consistency with 
inter-item correlations ranging between .44 and .62 and a Cronbach’s alpha of .89. 
Data analysis plan 
Multilevel modeling (MLM) was used for analyses given multiple EMA observations 
were nested within each participant. Linear mixed models were conducted with restricted 
maximum likelihood. Prior to testing study predictions, a series of MLM tested the potential 
convergent/divergent validity for each EMA scale. Previously validated, global scales for 
experiential avoidance (AAQ-II), valued action (VQ-Pro), social functioning (SSR), and 
psychological distress (DASS) were all included as fixed effects predicting each EMA scale, and 
with participant entered as a random effect. A hierarchical, step-wise approach was used to 
clarify the independent and incremental effects of each variable in predicting relevant EMA 
scales, with an intercept-only model used in step 1, the SSR added in step 2, VQ-Pro in step 3, 
AAQ-II in step 4, and DASS in step 5. It was expected that EMA valued action would be most 
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strongly related to global valued action (VQ-Pro) and social functioning (SSR), EMA 
experiential avoidance would be most strongly related to global experiential avoidance (AAQ-II) 
and distress (DASS), EMA negative affect would be most strongly related to psychological 
distress (DASS), and EMA positive affect would be most strongly related to valued action (VQ-
Pro), social functioning (SSR), and distress (DASS).  
To test the primary study predictions a hierarchical, step-wise approach was used with 
MLM for each momentary outcome (i.e., negative affect, positive affect, and valued action). An 
intercept-only model was first tested with individual participants specified as a random effect. 
The second step added the AAQ-II as a fixed effect to test whether global experiential avoidance 
predicted the momentary outcome. The third step added momentary experiential avoidance as a 
fixed effect to test whether momentary experiential avoidance predicted momentary outcomes 
while controlling for global experiential avoidance. In the last step, the interaction between the 
AAQ-II and momentary experiential avoidance was tested. The significance of fixed effects was 
examined with t-tests using Satterthwaite approximations for degrees of freedom. Improvements 
in model fit from each step adding a fixed effect were tested using Chi square. Significant 
interaction effects were decomposed through post hoc MLMs in which the relation between 
momentary experiential avoidance and the relevant outcome was tested at three levels of global 
experiential avoidance: low avoidance defined as participants at 1 SD or lower from the M AAQ-
II score (7-11), medium avoidance within 1 SD from the M AAQ-II score (12-25), and high 
avoidance at 1 SD or higher from M AAQ-II score (26 or higher). Momentary experiential 
avoidance, affect, and valued action were all used from the same time point for MLMs, rather 
than lagged analyses, given the item wording in which momentary experiential avoidance was 
assessed “since the last prompt” while affect was assessed “right now.” This approach was also 
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deemed most appropriate given the aims of the study were to examine in the moment effects 
from experiential avoidance, rather than the more variable and extended effects over an hour or 
day that might occur between EMA time points. There was no missing baseline data for the 
AAQ-II, but missing EMA observations were excluded from analyses.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses. On average, participants completed 19.10 assessments (SD = 
4.02, range = 3-24), which was just slightly below the expected number for full participation (21 
assessments based on completing 3 each day for 7 days). A total of 80% of the sample (n = 56) 
completed at least 80% of the prompted assessments. Overall there were 1,337 assessments 
completed across 70 participants. All analyses were conducted with available data, excluding 
approximately 170 missing momentary assessment data points (11% of observations). This 
approach of including all data (including for participants who completed as few as 3 
assessments) was used in order to adequately represent the available data and reduce potential 
biases that may occur when including only participants with a high degree of adherence to 
assessments.   
 Skewness and kurtosis were checked for each variable. All variables fit a normal 
distribution besides negative affect. A log transformation was used with negative affect to 
approximate a normal distribution.  
 MLM EMA validity analyses. Convergent/divergent validity was examined for each 
EMA scale in a series of stepwise MLM (see Table 1). For both EMA valued action and EMA 
positive affect the SSR (social functioning) was a significant predictor in step 2, and both the 
SSR and VQ-Pro (valued action) were significant predictors in step 3. Adding the AAQ-II 
(experiential avoidance) and DASS (distress) did not improve predictive models, and the SSR 
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and VQ-Pro continued to be significant predictors of EMA valued action and EMA positive 
affect in the final models. This provides preliminary support for the validity of the EMA valued 
action and positive affect scales, which are more strongly related to validated global measures of 
valued action and social functioning than experiential avoidance or distress.  
 The EMA negative affect scale was significantly related to the SSR (social functioning) 
in steps 2 and 3, but the AAQ-II (experiential avoidance) was the only significant predictor in 
step 4. Adding the DASS (distress) in step 5 further improved the predictive model, and with all 
predictors in the same model, only the DASS was a significant predictor of EMA negative affect. 
This provides preliminary support for the EMA negative affect scale, suggesting this measure is 
more strongly related to distress than other psychological variables.  
 For the EMA experiential avoidance scale, the SSR was a significant predictor in step 2, 
but adding the VQ-Pro did not improve the predictive model in step 3. Adding the AAQ-II in 
step 4 improved the predictive model, and only the AAQ-II remained a significant predictor of 
EMA experiential avoidance. Adding the DASS in the final step did not improve the predictive 
model, but none of the predictor variables remained significant in this step. This appears to be 
due to multicollinearity given the DASS and AAQ-II were highly correlated (r = .77, p < .001), 
consistent with some literature indicating measures of distress and experiential avoidance are 
sometimes highly overlapping (Wolgast, 2014). Step 4 provides a clear indicator that the AAQ-II 
is the strongest predictor of EMA experiential avoidance items when the highly correlated DASS 
is not included. When the AAQ-II was removed from the model, EMA experiential avoidance 
was significantly predicted by the DASS (b = .10, t[68.68] = 3.01, p < .01), but not the VQ (p = 
.92) or SSR (p = .74). Overall, these results indicate that EMA experiential avoidance items are 
more strongly related to global experiential avoidance and distress, than measures of positive 
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social functioning and valued action. This is consistent with the expected convergent/divergent 
validity patterns, although due the high correlation between the AAQ-II and the DASS it is 
difficult to further distinguish differential relations between these two constructs.  
To further assess the validity of the state EA measure, the level-1 intercepts for this 
variable were regressed onto the AAQ-II and the regression coefficients were standardized. 
There was a significant standardized association (equivalent to correlation) between the level-1 
intercept for EA and the AAQ-II of b = .411, p< .001, and 16.9% of the variance explained in the 
EA intercepts by the AAQ-II. 
Primary MLM analyses. A series of MLMs tested global experiential avoidance (AAQ-
II), momentary experiential avoidance, and the interaction between the AAQ-II and momentary 
experiential avoidance as predictors of momentary negative affect, positive affect, and valued 
action, nested within participants (see Table 2). The AAQ-II significantly predicted each 
momentary outcome and improved model fit relative to an intercept-only model. Momentary 
experiential avoidance significantly predicted each momentary outcome when it was added to a 
model including the AAQ-II, and this model had significantly better fit relative to the AAQ-II-
only model. Of note, the AAQ-II continued to significantly predict negative and positive affect 
when momentary experiential avoidance was added as a predictor, although the relation with 
valued action was now only a trend. In each case, greater global experiential avoidance and 
momentary experiential avoidance were related to greater negative affect, lower positive affect, 
and lower valued action.  
 In the final models, significant interactions were found between the AAQ-II and 
momentary experiential avoidance in predicting each outcome. This model had significantly 
better fit than the model that did not include an interaction term.  
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 To further examine these interaction effects, the sample was divided into three groups 
based on AAQ-II scores (1 SD below, M, and 1 SD above). For valued action, MLM results 
indicated a significant relation between greater momentary experiential avoidance and lower 
valued action at high global experiential avoidance (1 SD above M), b = -.26, t(242.40) = 3.48, p 
< .001, and medium global experiential avoidance (within 1 SD of M), b = -.16, t(793.40) = 3.60, 
p < .001. However, there was no relation between momentary experiential avoidance and valued 
action among those low in global experiential avoidance (1 SD below M), b = -.07, t(229.02) = 
.69, p = .45.  
For negative affect, MLM results indicated a similar significant relation between greater 
momentary experiential avoidance and greater negative affect at high global experiential 
avoidance, b = .21, t(224.34) = 8.90, p < .001, and medium global experiential avoidance, b = 
.21, t(15.32) = 15.23, p < .001. A significant relation was also found between momentary 
experiential avoidance and negative affect at lower global experiential avoidance, although the 
beta coefficient was approximately half the size as it was for higher global experiential 
avoidance, b = .11, t(229.30) = 4.31, p < .001.  
 For positive affect, there was a significant relation between greater momentary 
experiential avoidance and lower positive affect at high global experiential avoidance, b = -.42, 
t(241.24) = 5.56, p < .001, and medium global experiential avoidance, b = -.33, t(800.20) = 6.67, 
p < .001. There was no significant relation between momentary experiential avoidance and 
positive affect among those low in global experiential avoidance, b = -.12, t(227.98) = 1.19, p = 
.24. 
Discussion 
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 This study examined whether global experiential avoidance moderated relations between 
momentary experiential avoidance, affect, and valued action assessed through EMA. Consistent 
with previous research, greater global experiential avoidance and greater momentary experiential 
avoidance were both found to independently predict greater momentary negative affect, lower 
positive affect, and lower valued action. Significant moderation effects were found in predicting 
each momentary outcome such that momentary experiential avoidance was more strongly related 
to affect and valued action among participants who were higher in global experiential avoidance. 
These results highlight a key individual factor in determining when engagement in experiential 
avoidance in the moment is more or less harmful.  
 These findings are consistent with the psychological inflexibility theoretical model 
underlying ACT (Hayes et al., 2012). Engaging in behavior that functions to reduce an aversive 
internal state is not problematic in and of itself, but rather it is the pervasive pattern of rigidly 
engaging in such actions out of a strong unwillingness to have these experiences, even when it 
goes against personal values or direct contingencies. In other words, global experiential 
avoidance defines the broader intrapersonal context, currently and historically defined, in which 
momentary instances of experiential avoidance are particularly problematic.  
 Although this has not been examined in past EMA research, these findings are consistent 
with research on experiential avoidance using more global assessment methods. For example, 
global experiential avoidance, as measured by the AAQ-II, similarly moderates the relation of 
other maladaptive ways of responding to internal states, such as cognitive fusion and emotion 
regulation problems, with mental health (e.g., Bardeen & Fergus, 2016; Fergus et al, 2013). 
Global experiential avoidance also mediates relations between change-focused emotion 
regulation strategies (e.g., reappraisal, thought suppression) and mental health (Kashdan et al., 
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2006), suggesting these experientially avoidant ways of responding might lead to problems due 
to a broader, inflexible pattern of avoidance. Thus, engaging in experiential avoidance in the 
moment may be particularly harmful for individuals who are globally experientially avoidant, 
and thus, likely to engage in avoidance rigidly, even when it is ineffective to do so.  
One area for future research is to further clarify the mechanisms through which 
momentary experiential avoidance is more problematic for more globally avoidant individuals. It 
may be that such individuals engage in more pervasive, intense, or frequent patterns of 
experiential avoidance, some combination of which lead to more negative outcomes. It may also 
be the rigidity and context insensitivity in which avoidance is used (e.g., using avoidance in all 
contexts even those where more approach-oriented strategies are needed), which is consistent 
with the theory of emotion regulation flexibility (Aldao, Sheppes & Gross, 2015). A third 
hypothesis is that globally avoidant individuals use more ineffective experientially avoidant 
strategies such as thought suppression rather than cognitive reappraisal (Aldao et al., 2010). In 
addition to future EMA research, these hypotheses could be tested experimentally. For example, 
participants could be randomly assigned to versions of a mobile app that test hypothesized 
factors contributing to harmful effects of experiential avoidance such as type of coping strategy 
(e.g., emotional suppression vs. relaxation), frequency of coping strategy (e.g., practicing 
experiential avoidance once a day vs. multiple times a day), and flexibility with coping strategies 
used (e.g., only practicing experiential avoidance vs. practicing experiential avoidance and 
acceptance-based strategies). Such research could help identify patterns of momentary 
experiential avoidance that are more or less harmful for mental health. 
The current study is too limited to have direct applied implications, but exploring 
potential extensions into clinical practice may clarify the benefits of such detailed theory testing. 
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Some coping strategies commonly used in treatment approaches (e.g., cognitive reappraisal, 
relaxation) may function as experiential avoidance due to seeking to alter unwanted internal 
experiences. ACT theory suggests such methods that aim to change internal experiences might 
be counterproductive at times for clients who are highly avoidant of and inflexible in responding 
to unwanted internal experiences (Hayes et al., 2012; Levin et al., 2012). The current findings 
supported this theory with individuals high in global experiential avoidance, but with a measure 
combining more maladaptive (e.g., suppression) and adaptive (e.g., reappraisal) forms of 
momentary experiential avoidance. Ultimately, this could be examined experimentally by testing 
whether global experiential avoidance moderates the effects of training on more adaptive forms 
of experiential avoidance (e.g., relaxation, cognitive reappraisal) relative to training on 
maladaptive forms of experiential avoidance and control conditions. Such experimental research 
could lead to important clinical decision making guidelines for when to use acceptance-based 
approaches or how to tailor change-focused coping strategies to maximize their utility for clients.  
 One notable limitation with this study was the use of a relatively homogeneous college 
student sample and lack of a sample defined by clinically significant distress or a specific 
disorder cluster. This may have limited the generalizability of these findings and estimates of 
effects due to lower levels of distress. Further research should be conducted with more diverse 
and clinically distressed samples to determine if similar patterns are found.  
The study also used some new EMA items to assess constructs including experiential 
avoidance and valued action, which have not been previously examined for psychometric 
properties. Thus, it is possible that these items did not have adequate validity or reliability, 
though analyses in this dataset provide preliminary support. This is a common limitation in EMA 
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research due to the current state of the literature and focus on more specific contexts and 
questions that benefit from ideographically tailored assessment questions.  
The most notable validity concern might be with the momentary experiential avoidance 
measure, which had a moderate correlation with the AAQ-II as a global measure of experiential 
avoidance. A previous study found a larger correlation between a momentary measure of 
experiential avoidance with anxiety and the AAQ-II (r = .75; Kashdan et al., 2014). That said, 
this study differed in important ways that might have reduced correlations with the AAQ-II, 
including the use of a general sample, momentary items framed in relation to any distressing 
experience rather than anxiety specifically, and the inclusion of items assessing more specific 
behaviors that function as experiential avoidance, all of which may have increased variability in 
momentary assessment points that would attenuate associations with a global measure. In 
addition, the measure combined a range of different experientially avoidant behaviors, but did 
not provide adequate assessment to explore differential effects of specific forms of experiential 
avoidance, which research indicates have unique functions and contexts that moderate their 
efficacy (Shafir, Schwartz, Blechert & Sheppes, 2015). Future research might replicate these 
results with a further validated measure of experiential avoidance that provides more precise 
measurement of specific avoidant coping strategies. 
 In summary, this study adds to the literature by identifying global experiential avoidance 
as a key individual characteristic that could moderate the degree to which engaging in 
experiential avoidance in the moment leads to negative outcomes. Further research is needed to 
continue to examine more fine-grained, momentary relations between such psychological 
variables and mental health, particularly with attention to the contexts and individual 
characteristics that govern these relations. This research will serve to continue to test and refine 
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theoretical models at a deeper level, providing new insights to guide understanding of 
psychopathology and its amelioration.   
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Table 1. MLM results testing EMA scale validity. 
Momentary 
Variable 
Step  Intercept 
 
SSR  VQ-Pro  AAQ-II  DASS  χ2 
Experiential 
Avoidance 
1 1.93***      
2 2.88*** -.02**    6.71** 
 3 2.98*** -.02† -.01   .39 
 4 1.62* -.01 .01 .03**  7.55** 
 5 
 
1.32* -.004 .01 .02 .06 2.51 
Negative 
Affect 
1 .32***      
2 .80*** -.01***    15.28*** 
 3 .87*** -.01* -.01   1.81 
 4 .33† -.01 -.001 .01***  12.09*** 
 5 
 
.15 -.002 .00 .004 .04** 10.08** 
Positive Affect 1 3.11***      
 2 1.23*** .05***    26.85*** 
 3 .81* .03** .04**   7.38** 
 4 .86 .03** .04* -.001  .01 
 5 
 
.93 .03** .04* .002 -.02 .17 
Valued Action 1 3.26***      
 2 1.71*** .04***    22.40*** 
 3 1.24*** .02* .05***   11.52*** 
 4 .85† .02* .06*** .01  .94 
 5 .94† .02* .05*** .01 -.02 .31 
†p < .10, *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. χ2 tests comparing the previous MLM model to the 
current model. SSR = social functioning; VQ-Pro = valued action; AAQ-II = global experiential 
avoidance; DASS = psychological distress.  
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Table 2. MLM results in predicting momentary negative affect, positive affect, and valued action. 
 
Momentary Variable Step Intercept  AAQ-II  EA  AAQ-II * 
EA  
χ2 
Negative Affect 1 .32***     
2 .02 .02***   25.63*** 
3 -.23*** .01*** .19***  286.40*** 
4 
 
-.12† .004 .14*** .003* 4.24* 
Positive Affect  1 3.11***     
2 3.74*** -.03**   10.49** 
3 4.15*** -.02* -.33***  70.99*** 
4 
 
3.79*** -.004 -0.13 -.01* 3.90* 
Valued Action 1 3.26***     
2 3.71*** -.02*   6.24* 
3 3.93*** -.02† -.18***  21.69*** 
4 3.43*** .001 .08 -.01** 7.45** 
†p < .10, *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. χ2 tests comparing the previous MLM model to the 
current model. AAQ-II = global experiential avoidance; EA = momentary experiential 
avoidance. 
